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A student of mine once described Federal Courts (or Federal Jurisdiction,
as the course is sometimes called) as "the love child of Civ Pro and Con Law."
As described in these pages last year,' Federal Courts combines horizontal and
vertical concerns for distribution of federal power with a concern for
organization, structure, management, and operation of the courts.2 Part of that
mix is the central theoretical and doctrinal theme of the basic structural IL
Constitutional Law course; the other part is the core of at least part of the basic
IL Civil Procedure course.
Civil Rights (or Civil Rights Litigation or Constitutional Litigation or
Constitutional Torts3 or § 1983 Litigation) is the grandchild on this doctrinal
family tree. It takes the parent and mixes some remedies, criminal procedure,
individual rights (distinct from structural) constitutional law, and
employment/employment discrimination into the pedagogical DNA.
Section 1983 was enacted as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
Reconstruction-era legislation intended to enable Blacks and their supporters in
the South to vindicate newly secured rights in the face of Klan control (or at
least undue influence) over state governments and state courts.4 The provision
creates no rights. Rather, it provides a cause of action (a vehicle) for bringing
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. My thanks to the
editors of the Saint Louis University Law Journal for inviting me to participate in this
symposium.
1. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why and How to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 693 (2009).
2. Arthur D. Heliman, Another Voice for the "Dialogue": Federal Courts as a Litigation
Course, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 761,762-63 (2009).
3. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, MICHAEL L. WELLS, & THOMAS A. EATON,
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (2d ed. 2004). Jack Beerman suggests that constitutional tort litigation
refers to constitutional litigation, distinct from civil rights litigation under more recent
enactments, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Jack Michael Beermann, Qualified Immunity
and Constitutional Avoidance, __ Sup. Ct. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript I n.3).
4. See, e.g., Catherine E. Smith, The Group Dangers of Race-Based Conspiracies, 59
RUTGERS L. REV. 55, 61 (2006).
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claims to remedy deprivations of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws' 5 committed by any "person" acting "under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State. . ... "' An
elaborate, technical, nuanced, detailed, and specialized body of legal rules
(statutory, constitutional, and common law) has sprung up around this
relatively sparse nineteenth-century statutory language.
Federal Courts casebooks and courses typically touch four areas of core §
1983 law: action under color of law, 7 federal-official liability under Bivens,
8
municipal liability, 9 and official immunities, notably executive qualified
immunity.' 0 In addition, § 1983 and the process of litigating constitutional
claims underlie significant Fed Courts topics, such as the Younger and Pullman
abstention doctrines, I I the Anti-Injunction Act, 12 the obligation of state courts
to apply federal law,' 3 appealability,' 4 and state sovereign immunity. 15  In
5. "Laws" refers to federal laws-primarily, although not exclusively, rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S. 43, 50 n.3 (1997).
7. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that police officers act under color of
state law even when they violate state law, if clothed with apparent state authority); see, e.g.,
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 947 (6th ed. 2009);
ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAUREN K. ROBEL, & DAVID R. STRAS, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND THE LAWYERING PROCESS 914 (2d ed. 2009); PETER
W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 1151 (6th ed. 2008); MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS:
CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 295 (4th ed. 1998).
8. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); see, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 726; HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 504;
Low & JEFFERIES, supra note 7, at 189.
9. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at
965; LOw & JEFFERIES, supra note 7, at 1206.
10. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800 (1982); see, e.g., HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 982; Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 7,
at 1166.
11. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971) (holding that federal courts cannot enjoin
good-faith pending state criminal prosecution); R.R. Comm. Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
501 (1941) ("These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system
whereby the federal courts, 'exercising a wise discretion,' restrain their authority because of
'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth
working of the federal judiciary.") (citations omitted).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006) ("A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."); Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225, 226 (1972).
13. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. -_, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009); Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S.
911,919 (1997).
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short, § 1983 is a frequent (although not the sole) context in which the
principles and theories of Federal Courts are put to work. 16 These doctrinal
rules determine the availability and success of § 1983 claims and judicial
remedies for constitutional violations. Additionally, they make complete sense
only when considered in the fuller context of § 1983, as opposed to being
additional units in the overall survey of federal jurisdictional doctrine and
structural relations between Congress and the courts.
Thus it is time to let the grandchild leave home and take its independent
place in the law school curriculum. There is too much to § 1983, doctrinally
and normatively, for it to be given its due merely as part of a larger class on the
work of the federal courts.' 7 Attempting to give § 1983 sufficient depth within
the larger Federal Courts class detracts from coverage of other important
subjects that students should engage with and likely will not encounter
elsewhere in law school. Civil Rights Litigation becomes "Applied Federal
Courts," taking the general doctrines and core principles and themes from the
big course and applying them to a particular category of cases that forms a
substantial portion of the business of federal courts. 18 That application is best
taught and learned independently and in detail in a distinct course.
I am the only full-time faculty member at my current school teaching both
courses, so I want to use this paper to explain how I divide the material and
why it makes pedagogical sense to do so. My goal has been to establish a two-
course sequence, in which Federal Courts introduces the big-picture doctrines
and the principles of the federal courts, the issues that surround and determine
federal judicial jurisdiction, and the range of issues and cases landing in federal
court. Civil Rights then entails a beginning-to-end examination of
constitutional litigation under § 1983 and Bivens, touching on many of the
same doctrines, themes, and principles, but in the narrower context of one area
of common federal-court litigation.
14. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,519,526-27 (1985).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 159 (1908).
16. Michael L. Wells, A Litigation-Oriented Approach to Teaching Federal Courts, 53 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 857, 861-62 (2009).
17. The same is true for Habeas Corpus, both statutory habeas in which federal courts review
state and federal convictions, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (2006), and constitutional habeas that has
been at the center of War-on-Terror litigation and the recent three-way power battle among
Congress, the President, and the federal courts, although it cannot be covered in sufficient depth.
Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006). Habeas is included in many Federal Courts casebooks. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 1153; LOw & JEFFERIES, supra note 7, at 804; REDISH & SHERRY, supra note 7,
at 585.
18. CAROL KRAFKA, JOE S. CECIL, & PATRICIA LOMBARD, STALKING THE INCREASE IN THE
RATE OF FEDERAL CIVIL APPEALS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 8 (1995), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/pubic/pdf.nsf/lookup/rate-of-appeal.pdf/$file/rate-of-appeal.pdf (noting the
increase in the proportion of civil rights cases).
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The Law Journal dedicated last year's teaching issue to Federal Courts.
19
It is appropriate, then, to use these same pages to consider this pedagogical and
curricular off-shoot. Rather than looking at what should be in a Federal Courts
class and how the class should be taught, I want to focus on what should be
excised from Federal Courts and spun into an independent course.
I. WHY CIVIL RIGHTS
There are several reasons that Civil Rights Litigation deserves its own
course (whatever we call the course). First, there is the increased (and ever-
increasing) amount, complexity, and specialization of the material, both in
Federal Courts generally and in the narrower course. In the 2008-2009 Term,
the Supreme Court decided a number of cases that warrant at least some
mention in class discussions in a civil rights litigation course, and perhaps full
treatment in subject casebooks. 20 A two- to three-week cursory overview of
some areas of § 1983 as part of a broader thirteen-week discussion of the
business of the federal courts does not provide full coverage or put the material
in its full context. For example, most books include a major case on qualified
immunity. 2 But the proper approach to qualified immunity has changed twice
in the last decade, demanding a significant expenditure of time to explore this
22
evolution. And the significance of qualified immunity makes sense only in
the overall framework of a civil rights action, particularly after consideration
of whether a plaintiff had initially established a violation of her rights.
Moreover, qualified immunity functions as the default defense when absolute
immunities applicable to particular actors and particular conduct are not in
play-but those other immunities typically are not covered in Fed Courts.2' As
19. See Fallon, supra note 1; Laura E. Little, Teaching Federal Courts: From Bottom Line to
Mystery, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 797 (2009); Wells, supra note 16.
20. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct 2633
(2009) (granting qualified immunity to school officials who conducted a strip search of a student
suspected of possession and distribution of ibuprofen); Dist. Atty's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S.
__ 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (rejecting § 1983 claim to obtain DNA testing); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (requiring intentional action to establish supervisory
liability for First Amendment and equal protection claims); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S.
- 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009) (applying absolute prosecutorial immunity to policy decisions by
heads of prosecutor office); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009)
(establishing standard for qualified immunity); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S.
- 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009) (holding that Title IX does not preclude § 1983 constitutional claim
for same conduct).
21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
22. See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 819 (rejecting mandatory two-step, merits-first approach
established in 2001 in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)); see also Beermann, supra note 3
(manuscript at 2-3).
23. See Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 859-60, (discussing scope of absolute prosecutorial
immunity); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998) (recognizing legislative immunity as
[Vol. 54:821
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the law of § 1983 becomes more detailed and complex, it makes it difficult for
Federal Courts professors to cover the material in sufficient depth or detail to
have it make sense without taking time away from other general jurisdictional
issues, which themselves remain the subject of constant attention, expansion,
24and development in courts and in Congress.
Second, Civil Rights is not one subpart of a broader discussion of
Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the judicial process as it affects the
general function of the federal courts. Rather, § 1983 is a specific area of
substantive federal law with its own elaborate body of substantive,
jurisdictional, and procedural rules that puts those themes and principles into
action. It is uniquely common business that many students will encounter in a
25
range of professional endeavors. Some graduates will work as judges and
many as federal law clerks, where § 1983 and Bivens claims comprise a
26
significant portion of the docket. Others will work for various levels of
government as lawyers, perhaps litigating civil rights claims on behalf of
government and government officials. Some will become plaintiff-side trial
lawyers, with civil rights litigation forming a substantial (and potentially
27lucrative) part of their practice. Some might even find themselves as § 1983
and Bivens defendants. 28 All are well served by a dedicated course exploring
the full scope of the doctrine and principles.
The course I envision sounds much like the litigation-oriented approach to
29Fed Courts that Michael Wells described in these pages last year. Wells
begins his class with the core § 1983 material that is the crux of my Civil
Rights course, using it as a bridge to explore the academic and theoretical
questions at the heart of the common Federal Courts curriculum, as well as
more general federal jurisdictional doctrines (standing, federal common law,
applicable to all levels of state and local government); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1992)
(considering scope of judicial immunity).
24. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009) (discussing the obligation of
state courts to follow federal law); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1143
(2009) (considering whether a party had standing to challenge federal regulations); Constitution
Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005); Congressional Accountability for Judicial
Activism Act of 2004, H.R. 3920, 108th Cong. (2004).
25. See Wells, supra note 16, at 871-72 (arguing class time should highlight concepts
students will encounter in real life legal practice).
26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
27. Unlike ordinary state tort litigation, § 1983 (and other civil rights statutes) offer the
attorney fees for private plaintiffs' lawyers whose clients prevail in litigation. See 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b) (2006).
28. See, e.g., Padilla v. Yoo, 2009 WL 1651273, at *1-2, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying
motion to dismiss in Bivens action brought by War-on-Terror detainee against former attorney in
Office of Legal Counsel). Obviously, defendants in actions implicating prosecutorial and judicial
immunity will have gone to law school.
29. Wells, supra note 16, at 860.
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federal question jurisdiction, etc.). By grasping the general principles of §
1983, Wells argues, students gain the tools to grasp the power and reach of
general Federal Courts principles in their real-world applications.
31
I share Wells's view that § 1983-understood in practical, litigation-
oriented terms-is essential to understanding principles of federal judicial
power and the function of the federal courts and vice versa. And I join him in
rejecting the notion that the particulars of § 1983 are comparatively less
significant than broad principles or scholarly ideas. But a distinct civil rights
course provides the best of both worlds-the scholarly, ethereal, legal-process
approach that defines the typical (including my) Federal Courts class, as well
as the litigation-oriented focus on § 1983 which illustrates those principles in
action. It spreads coverage across two classes, leaving two full semesters to
explore both theoretical and applied approaches and to give students the
benefits of each.
Third, federal litigation and the federal judiciary became significant
enough to justify a stand-alone course and independent area of study only in
the middle of the last century. That change corresponded temporally with an
increase in the amount and scope of substantive federal law, beginning with the
New Deal and picking up speed with the Warren Court and the Great
Society. 32 Section 1983 is part of this substantive explosion. Virtually all of
the material covered in Civil Rights dates from the early 1960s forward.
Congress enacted § 1983 during Reconstruction, 33 but between 1871 and 1940,
federal courts decided only twenty-one cases.34 Section 1983's emergence as a
meaningful part of federal law and the work of federal courts required several
post-New Deal developments: (1) wide incorporation of the Bill of Rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the Warren Court's decision in Monroe
expansively interpreting the concept of action "under color" of state law and
recognizing § 1983 as a primary right of action in federal court, even as to
conduct that might also violate state law;35 and (3) the Bivens decision ten
years later recognizing a direct constitutional action for damages against
30. Id. at 861-62.
31. Id. at 867.
32. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 512 (1986); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 284-85 (1989).
33. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,204 (1961).
34. THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 65 (5th
ed. 2004) (citations omitted).
35. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183; Myriam E. Gilles, Police, Race and Crime in 1950s
Chicago: Monroe v. Pape as Legal Noir, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 41, 53-54 (Myriam E. Gilles
& Risa L. Goluboff, eds. 2008).
[Vol. 54:821
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federal officers. 36  Judicial recognition of private damages litigation as a
primary vehicle for enforcing constitutional rights37 made the study of that
vehicle a necessary part of the law school curriculum. The subsequent
pullback on many important issues becomes fodder for further exploration of
the substantive landscape.
38
Finally, although both courses touch on similar ideas, principles, and
themes, their respective focuses differ. As Arthur Hellmann argued in these
pages last year, the focus in Federal Courts is structural and institutional;
principles are examined from the point of view of Congress and the courts as
"institutions of governance." 39  Federal Courts is primarily about the
institutional relationships between Congress and the federal courts or between
federal courts and state courts-when federal courts can and should act, when
Congress can control when or how federal courts can act, and when federal
courts can control what states or Congress do. In discussing federalism and
separation of powers, the material often speaks of federal "interests," reflecting
a concern for whether it is in the institutional interests of the federal
government and federal law to have a class of cases in federal court and which
federal institution gets to make that choice.
40
The theme in Civil Rights Litigation is individual-usually constitutionally
based-rights and the process of enforcing and vindicating those rights. The
federal "interest" in having the case litigated and decided in federal court is
less institutional and more individual, resting with the plaintiff whose
constitutional rights allegedly have been infringed and who seeks judicial relief
and remedy. The concern is for the plaintiff and what she must do to vindicate
her rights-what she must plead and prove in her case, what defenses and
procedural hurdles she must overcome, and what remedies she may obtain if
successful.4 1  There often is concern for bottom-line results-did the
plaintiff/rights-holder prevail, and, if she did not, have her "rights been
enforced?" Does civil rights doctrine and practice match the theory that for
36. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971).
37. See id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or
nothing."); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
38. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); see generally Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See
also Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Teaching Civil Rights with an Eye on Practice: The Problem of
Maintaining Morale, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 769 (2010).
39. Hellman, supra note 2, at 762-63.
40. See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 692 (2006)
(citations omitted); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313-
14 (2005) ("It has in fact become a constant refrain in such cases that federal jurisdiction
demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal
interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.").
41. Infra Part Il.
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every right there is a remedy?42 To the extent it engages the same structural
and institutional debates about the judicial role and the balance of power
between Congress and the courts or between federal courts and state courts, the
focus remains squarely on how those disputes affect individual-rights
claimants and vindication of their constitutional liberties.
Consider, for example, one topic covered in both courses-parity between
federal and state courts and Burt Neuborne's seminal article, The Myth of
Parity.43 Parity provides the logical support for the various federal abstention
doctrines. The discussion of parity in Federal Courts is institutional-it
considers the structural issues that distinguish federal from state courts and the
federalist balance; the historical fact that state courts were (and were expected
to be) primary courts of original jurisdiction and the structural-federalism
concerns that raised; and the fact that concerns about state courts' respect for
federal law date to the Founding and early days of the Constitution, long
before the Warren Court's "rights revolution." The discussion in Civil Rights
is narrower and exclusively modern: the question is whether parity exists for
vindicating individual federal constitutional rights, what it means for courts to
vindicate rights, and how concerns for individual (as opposed to structural)
rights dictate forum allocation choices.
It is not surprising that § 1983 has quickly become such a major part of the
federal judicial docket that Federal Courts no longer can give full and
meaningful pedagogical consideration to this area. The material demands its
own, more practically oriented course.
II. TEACHING CIVIL RIGHTS
The question is what material to cover in Civil Rights-a course designed
to give a complete presentation of the doctrinal and policy issues in § 1983,
going into far greater detail than in the typical Federal Courts class. The
course is best divided into seven subjects, roughly following the chronological
flow of issues arising in a typical § 1983 action. Most of the main casebooks
are organized (in varying order) along these major subjects.
42. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)) ("The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury.").
43. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977). See also William B.
Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 599-60 (1999) (exploring the
advantages of bringing civil rights claims in state courts in the context of gay rights).
[Vol. 54:821
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A. Basic Elements of Constitutional Claims: State Action
We begin with claims against individual officers and the requirement that
the defendant act "under color"44 of state law, which roughly corresponds to
the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 We start with
Monroe and its expansive interpretation of the concept to reach public officials
whose conduct violates state law but who nevertheless were "clothed" with the
authority (or apparent authority) of state law such that their actions were
"made possible" only by their positions under state law.46
We then turn to a different state action issue-when private individuals or
entities are deemed to act under color of state law by virtue of some joint or
coordinated action with government, such that the private entity becomes
subject to constitutional liability.47 This doctrine was particularly vigorous
during the Civil Rights Era, although it has made something of a comeback in
recent years." The recent trend towards privatizing governmental functions
has increased the issue's significance.49
While many Federal Courts casebooks include Monroe as a major case, a
full discussion of the "under color" element is beyond the scope of that class.
But it is central to a complete understanding of constitutional litigation: who
can (and should) be sued for a constitutional violation, and who is subject to
constitutional limits and possible constitutional liability.
B. Basic Elements of Constitutional Claims: Rights, Privileges, and
Immunities
The second element of a § 1983 claim is a deprivation of a "right[],
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws.,, 50 The starting
point is Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, including
incorporated Bill of Rights provisions against state and local governments, as
well as liability for tort-like outrageous executive misconduct.51 Then comes
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
45. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982).
46. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-85 (1961) (citations omitted); Gilles, supra note
35, at 53-54; Michael L. Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L.
REv. 1097, 1103-04 (1985).
47. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-97
(2001); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 926-29; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961).
48. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Remembrance of Things Past? Reflections on the Warren
Court and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1055, 1064-65 (2002).
49. See Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (accepting, implicitly, that
private company acted under color of federal law in operating federal prisons); Jody Freeman,
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 551-56 (2000).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
51. See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46(1998).
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procedural due process, with particular consideration of underlying structural
federalism issues and the effect of available post-deprivation state judicial
remedies on federal due process claims.52  The connection between due
process and state remedies makes these claims different than other
constitutional-rights claims, as to which the availability of state-law remedies
is irrelevant.
53
Next, we consider the "and laws" language of § 1983 and its use to
vindicate violations of federal statutes, which raises unique issues of separation
of powers. 54  Finally, we consider the relationship between § 1983
constitutional claims and other federal civil rights statutes and when a
substance-specific statute, often containing its own detailed remedial scheme,
precludes a constitutional claim (under Bivens or § 1983) for the same
conduct.
55
C. Claims Against Federal Officials
We briefly detour to discuss Bivens, the judge-made federal parallel to §
561983. This section covers the Court's decision in Bivens itself, as well as
recent cases applying the "factors counseling hesitation" concept to limit
availability of Bivens actions in many circumstances.57 One key point here is
the disconnect between the claims that can be pursued against state and local
officers under § 1983 as opposed to against federal officers; underlying that is
the issue of the relative powers of Congress and courts and which is the
appropriate source of any cause of action for pursuing constitutional claims.
D. Individual Officer Defenses
The focus of the course then shifts from plaintiff to defendant by
introducing the immunity defenses available to all individual, state, and federal
52. See generally Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S
327, 330-32 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
53. Cf Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 561 (4th Cir. 2005).
54. Compare Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1980) (recognizing that § 1983 vehicle
can be used to remedy violations of federal statutes), with Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,
284-87 (2002) (tying answer to congressional intent in underlying statute). I spend time in
Federal Courts teaching implied statutory rights of action. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 293 (2001). This is the flipside, which I mention briefly in a Federal Courts course,
only to show the connection between the doctrines. Thiboutot also allows exploration of the
jurisdictional question of where courts get the power to hear § 1983 claims. 448 U.S. at 7-8 n.6;
compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006), with id. § 1343(a)(3) (2006).
55. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 793-97 (2009).
56. Cf Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. -_, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (quoting Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006)) (describing Bivens as the "federal analog" to § 1983).
57. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550-68 (2007).
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officer defendants-absolute legislative, 58 judicial, 59 and prosecutorial 6°
immunity, as well as the default executive qualified immunity.6 1 These
affirmative defenses are the flipside to the elements of the plaintiffs claim;
they apply only when the plaintiff has established (or at least pled) a violation
of rights under color of law that should entitle her to recovery.62
E. Governmental Liability
The course then moves from claims against individual officer defendants
to claims against governmental-entity defendants, with different rules applying
to different levels of government.
For local governments, this means Monell and the Byzantine doctrine of
municipal liability. Government is not subject to vicarious liability merely
because one of its officers acts in an unconstitutional manner.63  A local
government is liable for misconduct occurring pursuant to formal policy
established by a policymaker, for conduct engaged in by a "policymaker," or
for deliberate failure of policymakers to train, supervise, control, or otherwise
manage their inferior officers.
64
For state governments, this discussion leads to the Eleventh Amendment
and state sovereign immunity, another subject typically covered in depth in
Federal Courts. This overlap presents a dilemma I am still working through.
One approach is to excise sovereign immunity entirely from Federal Courts
(beyond a brief primer) and place the entire subject into Civil Rights. At some
level this makes sense because the real Eleventh Amendment action now
centers on the scope of Congress' powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, making it a clean fit for a course on litigating constitutional and
statutory public law rights.65 And § 1983/Bivens66 and Ex Parte Young67 share
a common theme-litigation is targeted primarily at individual officers
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1998) (citing
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951)).
59. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1992) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526 (1985)).
60. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 859-61 (2009).
61. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
807-08 (1982).
62. See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818-22 (2009); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967);
Am. Fire, Theft, & Collisions Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991).
63. Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
64. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997) (citations omitted);
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989); St. Louis v. Praprotmik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988)
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690).
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006);
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518,520 (2004).
66. See supra Part II.C.
67. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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("persons") rather than government entities. Alternatively, we could cover the
Eleventh Amendment in both classes, but narrow the focus in Civil Rights.
Following a broad overview of the Eleventh Amendment, 68 Civil Rights would
examine the link between the Eleventh Amendment and constitutional
litigation, including whether states are "persons" subject to suit under § 1983,69
the extent to which states can be directly sued and held liable for constitutional
violations, 70 and the role of Ex Parte Young.
We finish this part with two issues that bridge pure individual liability with
entity liability. The first is supervisory liability and the rules for holding
higher-level officials individually responsible for the misconduct of their
underlings on the ground. 7' The second is the often-difficult task of dividing
and distinguishing state from local government and local government
functions. Litigants and courts often must determine whether a particular
officer defendant works for local government (in which case the government
entity might be liable on a Monell claim, on a proper showing) or for the state
(in which case entity liability is unavailable). 72 The second is an important
aspect of Eleventh Amendment doctrine, but again is understandable only
within the full context of a focus on § 1983.
F. Procedural Hurdles
The next part of the course examines a series of procedural hurdles that
plaintiffs must overcome to prevail on § 1983 actions. Some of these hurdles
are covered in Federal Courts, others are not. Again, however, the key is the
contextualized and practical coverage in the stand-alone course. If the
overriding theme of Civil Rights is how individuals vindicate (or do not
vindicate) constitutional rights, this section considers the many unexpected
hurdles to that vindication.
First is the requirement of exhaustion of state judicial and administrative
remedies as a prerequisite to bringing federal constitutional claims.73 Second
is the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey,74 and whether particular constitutional
rights can be asserted through § 1983 (which does not require exhaustion of
state remedies) or must be asserted only through Habeas Corpus (which does
68. For an ideal case surveying the overall doctrinal landscape of the Eleventh Amendment,
although not a § 1983 case, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
69. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Quem v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 342-44 (1979).
70. See generally United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
71. Of course, there is some question whether supervisory liability still exists. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 557 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009) ("[V]icarious liability is inapplicable to
Bivens and § 1983 suits .... ); see also id. at 1957-58 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. McMiUian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786-89 (1997).
73. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
74. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
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require exhaustion of state processes).75  This triggers an important side
discussion on the effectiveness of § 1983 as a vehicle for remedying
constitutional violations occurring within state criminal proceedings, especially
for violations leading to wrongful convictions and claims of actual innocence.
It also requires a brief lecture on the contours of Habeas Corpus.
76
Next comes issue and claim preclusion and the extent to which legal and
factual conclusions in state proceedings (civil, criminal, or administrative) are
binding on a subsequent federal constitutional claim brought in federal court.
7 7
This allows discussion of litigation strategy, the overlap between federal and
state claims, and the right (and occasional need) to bring claims together in one
action in some court. Lastly, we examine the intersection of all these
procedural issues, as well as statutes of limitations, through the decision in
Wallace v. Kato,78 which considered the accrual date and timeliness of Fourth
Amendment claims in an actual-innocence/wrongful prosecution case.
The next procedural hurdle is abstention, covered in great detail in Federal
Courts and more narrowly here. Consider several important points about
covering abstention in Civil Rights. First, there is some debate among teachers
as to whether abstention should be covered in the course, and only one of the
major casebooks includes it.79 Second, discussion can be limited only to the
two abstention doctrines most frequently in play in § 1983 litigation-Pullman
and Younger. Third, the discussion in Civil Rights ties the conversation less to
the structural question of the judicial power to abstain and more tightly to the
history and purpose of § 1983, Congress' intent in creating that litigation
vehicle, and whether abstention is consistent with that statutory purpose.80
Finally, abstention permits discussion of unique procedural issues related to
75. Id. at 480-81.
76. Habeas is included in some Civil Rights casebooks. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note
34, at 427. It is similarly specialized and complicated-too much for full inclusion in this course
beyond a basic outline lecture that enables students to see the connections between habeas and §
1983 as vehicles for pressing federal constitutional claims. Again, I believe Habeas demands its
own third course, independent of both Federal Courts and Civil Rights Litigation. See supra note
17 and accompanying text.
77. See Migra v. Warren Sch. Dist. Bd. Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 75-76 (1984); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1980).
78. 549 U.S. 384 (2007).
79. See EISENBERG, supra note 34, at 547. A second Civil Rights book is an offshoot of the
Low & JEFFRIES Federal Courts casebook. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., PAMELA S. KARLAN,
PETER W. Low & GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2007). This book does not include abstention, but the publishers permit
teachers to pull material from one book to use with the other. Id. at iii-xviii.
80. See Wells, supra note 16, at 1097-98.
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prospective relief under § 1983, including declaratory judgments81 and three-
judge district courts.82
G. Remedies
We finish the course with the remedies that a plaintiff can recover if she
proves the elements of her basic claim and overcomes the immunity defenses
and procedural hurdles-in other words, after everything we have discussed up
to this point of the course. Remedies include damages, attorneys' fees, and
injunctive relief (including structural or positive institutional-reform
injunctions), all considered in light of the policies of § 1983 litigation. For
example, we consider that there is no recovery for the intrinsic value of
constitutional rights, meaning big money is not in play in many actions and
plaintiffs often are limited to nominal damages. 83 In considering attorneys'
fees, we discuss the concept of the "Private Attorney General" and the
congressional goal and public benefit derived from increasing civil rights
enforcement through individual damages litigation. 84 We also consider the
extent to which attorneys' fees have become an intrinsically valuable remedy
that imposes its own deterrence on government misconduct.
III. CONCLUSION: CONNECTING FEDERAL COURTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Because I teach both courses, my interest in Civil Rights Litigation affects
my approach to Federal Courts and vice versa. My goal is to avoid unnecessary
redundancy and to create a genuine two-course sequence with distinct parts
and themes, while making both work as stand-alone courses. To the extent
possible, I cover none of the core Civil Rights material described in Part II in
my Federal Courts class, leaving it entirely for Civil Rights. I ignore the details
of § 1983, Bivens, individual immunity, and Monell. I teach abstention in both
classes, but more broadly in Federal Courts, covering all abstention doctrines,
not only those typically applicable to § 1983 litigation. Most recently, I
entirely omitted the Eleventh Amendment from Federal Courts. That last
move was less about overlap and repetition than about the need for more time
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
82. Id. § 2284; Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-
Judge District Court, 70 U. PiTr. L. REv. 101 (2008).
83. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731-36 (1989); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 266-67 (1978).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602-10 (2001); William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney
General" Is-And Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2129 (2004).
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in Federal Courts to cover other material. But the topic becomes expendable
precisely because Civil Rights is in the curriculum to pick up the slack.
85
The final issue is sequencing. Pedagogically, my inclination is to move
from the general to the specific, so I recommend that students take Federal
Courts to be introduced to the doctrine, principles, and themes before looking
at them in the specific § 1983 context.86 On the other hand, Wells argues that
understanding specific § 1983 doctrine enables students to better grasp the
general ethereal principles and concepts of Federal Courts, meaning students
will get more out of the theory of Federal Courts if they have seen the
principles in action in the specific course first.
87
Ultimately, sequencing matters less than the broader point that Civil Rights
Litigation must have space alongside Federal Courts in the law school
curriculum. Both should be part of pedagogical immersion in the world of
federal public law litigation for all students interested in clerking, in practicing
public law and constitutional litigation in federal court, or simply in
understanding the process for vindicating civil rights.
85. In Fed Courts, I assigned a five-page primer on the doctrine and did a ten-minute
summary lecture that largely served as a trailer for the civil rights course or a basic grounding for
Bar Review.
86. Wells might say that I fall into the trap of many Federal Courts teachers. Wells, supra
note 16, at 860-61.
87. Id. at 867.
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